The Board of Immigration Appeals:
A Critical Appraisal

MAURICE A. ROBERTS*

The retired Chairmanof the Board of ImmigrationAppeals
examines the Board's role and appraisesits capacity to fulfill
its function as the final administrative arbiter.He traces its
origins and development, culminatingin its present expanded
role as substitute for the United States district courts in the
chain of review in deportationcases. The authorcontends that
to produce the level of decisions crucial to its mission, the
Board must have additionalresources which are adequate in
quality as well as in number.Mr.Roberts discusses the qualification standardsfor Board members and concludes that the
Board's needs can best be met by giving it statutory recognition.

The Board of Immigration Appeals is a quasi-judicial tribunal
attached to the office of the Attorney General which reviews on
appeal specified types of decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Some people confuse the Board with the Service and
think it is part of the Service. It is not. Others think the Board
supervises the Service. It does not, except to the degree that Board
decisions are binding on the Service. The Board and the Service are
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separate entities within the Department of Justice whose functions,
while complementary, are distinct.
The first time I heard of the Board of Immigration Appeals was in
1941, shortly after I entered the Immigration and Naturalization
Service as a naturalization examiner. One of my co-workers, an oldtimer assigned to show me the ropes, referred derogatorily to "those
SOB's at the Board." Years later, after I had joined the Board, a
colleague there called it the "stepchild" of the Department of
Justice-unloved, ill-housed, and poorly provisioned. In retrospect, it
seems more accurate to describe the Board's relationship to the Department as that of an acknowledged bastard, whose presence cannot
be realistically denied but whose legitimacy is rendered questionable
by its lack of any statutory recognition.
The Board has existed, in one form or another and by one name or
another, since the early days of effective immigration law enforcement in this country. By now, its place among the essential administrative institutions in that field has been firmly fixed and is widely
acknowledged.' Yet, it has never been accorded statutory recognition, and its continued existence depends entirely on the regulations
of the Attorney General who can curtail its powers or abolish it
altogether by the stroke of a pen. Worse still, its precarious position
undermines its capacity to compete for the resources, human and
material, which it needs to carry out its mission effectively. In my
view, it is high time that the Board receive statutory recognition and
that its continued existence as an independent institution be endorsed by Congress.
This Article will develop briefly the origins and history of the
Board, its emergence to its present posture, the problems which
confront the Board as an institution, and some realistic solutions.
UNIQUE NATURE OF IMMIGRATION CASES

No appraisal of the Board as an institution can be valid without
taking into account the unique nature of the cases which come before
it. With minor exceptions, our immigration laws directly and exclusively affect human beings. In constant opposition to the Govern1. For example, in its report on the proposed "sanctions" bill, H.R. 8713,94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), the House Judiciary Committee remarked that administrative penalties against employers of illegal aliens would be imposed only after
a hearing before an immigration judge, "and the Committee has been assured
by the Department of Justice that the Board of Immigration Appeals will be
authorized to hear appeals from his decision." H.R. REP. No. 94-506, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 14 (1975).
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ment's restrictive and selective immigration policies are the interests
of the men, women, and children whose hopes for future happiness
frequently depend on their ability to enter or remain in this country.
The courts have recognized that when an alien has been here for a
long time and has established roots, his expulsion may tear him from
his home and family and deprive him "of all that makes life worth
living."2 When a United States citizen or a legally resident alien
seeks reunion with his alien wife or children, the denial of the immigrant visas needed to bring them here presents3 the cruel option of
choosing between his country or his loved ones.
Immigration statutes are highly technical and exceedingly complex; questions of statutory construction are frequently presented for
initial determination by administrative authorities whose personal
attitudes may have a crucial effect in the decision-making process.
Even the officials charged with immigration law enforcement occasionally make mistakes and erroneously admit inadmissible aliens
whose roots here have become well established by the time the error
is later discovered.' The absence of any realistic time limit on the
Service's power to start deportation proceedings against an alien
alleged to be here unlawfully only aggravates the opportunities for
hardship. Although Congress has provided various avenues of relief
from deportation to avoid extreme hardship for aliens meeting certain eligibility requirements, these dispensations are not awarded to
all those eligible' but depend on the favorable exercise of administrative discretion, which may depend on the subjective attitudes of
the administrators.6
2. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).

3. The courts have held that no constitutional limitations are violated by
immigration statutes having such results. Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162
(E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Fiallo v. Bell, 97 S. Ct. 1473 (1977).
[T]he burden of separation from one's kin which occurs when an alien
relative is properly excludable under our immigration laws and the
American citizen or resident determines not to leave this country in
order to be with the alien, is not the equivalent of the statutory destruction of the marriage or family relationship. Certainly a difficult choice is
involved, but it is not one which is forbidden by the Constitution.
406 F. Supp. at 168.
4. Such errors on the part of Service officials do not estop the Service from
deporting innocent aliens in the absence of official "affirmative misconduct."
Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
5. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72 (1957).
6. See Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the ImmigrationLaws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 144 (1975).

Legal fictions and myths, unrelated to reality, abound in immigration law. An arriving alien whose admissibility is questioned, and
who is permitted physically to enter and reside in the United States
on parole, is regarded by the law as if he is still at the border seeking
admission, no matter how many years have elapsed since he actually
entered. In the eyes of the law, he never made an "entry." 7 The courts
have adhered to the myth that the deportation of an alien, even when
based on his conduct in this country following a lawful admission for
permanent residence, is not punishment in the constitutional sense.
Consequently, the plenary power of Congress to legislate on immigration matters is not limited by the Constitution's ex post facto, bill
of attainder, and cruel and unusual punishment clauses.8 Statutes
have been sustained which make a resident alien deportable for past
conduct that was not a ground for deportation when it occurred. 9 For
example, an alien who had entered illegally as a stowaway but who
had subsequently achieved a status of nondeportability in the 1920's
under a then-existing five-year statute of limitations was held to
again be deportable when the statute of limitations was retroactively
repealed many years later. ° An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, no matter how long he has lived here and how secure
his right to remain, places that right in jeopardy the moment he
leaves the United States, however briefly." While an alien in deportation proceedings is constitutionally entitled to procedural due
process in determining whether he is within the deportable class set
up by Congress, as charged by the Service, the courts have held
themselves powerless to review the congressional classifications for
substantive due process-even when satisfied that adherence to12the
reasonable relationship standard ordinarily required is lacking.
Added to the foregoing elements is the fact that aliens in general
are a disadvantaged minority in our society. Many have come to
7. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); Yuen Sang Low v. Attorney
Gen., 479 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id., § 10, cl. 1.
9. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
10. Lehmann v. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957).
11. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963); Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (1933);
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 [hereinafter cited as I. & N. Act] §
101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1970). Cf. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953) (an alien who seeks to re-enter the United States hfter having left the
United States for purposes of his own has the status of an entrant alien for
constitutional purposes).
12. Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court recently
stated that the cases "reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility
under the Constitution even with respect to the power of Congress to regulate
the admission and exclusion of aliens. . . ." Fiallo v. Bell, 97 S.Ct. 1473 (1977)
(dictum). No case was cited for this dictum and the Court went on to sustain the
legislation involved.
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escape the poverty and hopeless lack of opportunity in their native
lands. Many arrive under emergency conditions as refugees from
political or religious persecution. Most lack proficiency in our language and knowledge of our institutions. Economically, aliens frequently have lower incomes and are unable to afford the rapidly
mounting charges for adequate professional representation. As nonvoters, they lack political clout. In times of economic or political
stress they present a ready and defenseless target not only for the
demagogues but also for concerned citizens seeking simplistic
answers to complex social and economic problems.
We have come a long way from the days when Ellis Island was the
gateway and when the immigration laws and procedures were simple
and summary. The accommodation of the competing interests involved in the complex issues now presented in immigration cases and
the rendition of far-reaching decisions which are realistic yet consonant with our traditional concern for individuals demand qualifications of an increasingly high order on the part of the men and
women entrusted with the responsibility of judging.
ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF THE BOARD

In the early days of federal immigration law enforcement, administrative responsibility was placed in the Treasury Department. In
1891, Congress created the post of Superintendent of Immigration in
that Department. In 1903, the Bureau of Immigration was transferred to the Department of Commerce and Labor and then, in 1913,
to the newly created Department of Labor. Until 1921, decisions in
immigration cases were made by employees of the Bureau of Immigration in the form of memoranda presented for signature to the
Commissioner-General of Immigration and the Secretary of Labor,
without opportunity for oral argument. In 1921, an advisory committee known as the Board of Review was formed to assist the Secretary
of Labor in these quasi-judicial functions. The five-member Board,
appointed by anAd responsible to the Secretary of Labor, was designed to provide a continuing body before which there would be an
opportunity to present oral argument and other matters for review.
Although it was designated initially as the Commissioner's and Secretary's Board of Review, in practice the Board was responsible to
the Secretary rather than to the Commissioner-General. The Board's
operations came under increasing criticism because of its combination of enforcement and quasi-judicial responsibilities and because
of its control by the Commissioner, an enforcement official. In its

1931 study of enforcement of the federal laws, the Wickersham Commission recommended the creation of an independent
tribunal, com13
pletely separated from enforcement functions.
In 1933, the Bureau of Immigration was merged with the Bureau of
Naturalization to form the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
headed by the Commissioner, and the Board of Review was converted
into the Commissioner's Board of Review. At one point, the system
was changed to make use of three five-member boards, with a chairman and four members on each. The Board's function continued to be
that of recommending decisions, with the final order being signed by
the Secretary of Labor. Following a study by the Secretary of Labor's
Committee on Administrative Procedure in 1939, the Board was
freed from all its non-quasi-judicial functions and made responsible
only to the Secretary of Labor, who still made the final decisions.14
In 1940, immigration law enforcement was committed to the Attorney General, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service was
transferred to the Department of Justice. It was then that the Board
of Immigration Appeals was created by regulation of the Attorney
General as a separate entity in the Department of Justice, responsible
directly to the Attorney General and completely independent of the
Service.
The Board's membership and powers are defined by the regulations. Its members are appointed by the Attorney General, have no
fixed terms, and serve at his pleasure. 5 Although they have no tenure
in office, as far as I am aware none has ever been removed. The
Board's jurisdiction to review Service decisions is fixed by the regulations, which have been altered from time to time. 6 Unlike its
predecessor-the Board of Review-which made only recommended
decisions, the Board of Immigration Appeals is a decisive body; it
makes binding decisions without the need for referring the case to
the Attorney General for final review."
Originally, in deportation cases, the Service's hearing officer made
only a recommended decision, to which was added the Commissioner's recommendation as the record made its way through the Service's Central Office en route to the Board of Immigration Appeals. It
13.

REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEPORTATION LAWS OF THE UNITED

162 (1931).
14. See Greene v. INS, 313 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828

STATES

(1962); 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1) (1976); 25 Fed. Reg. 2460 (1960).

15. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1) (1976).
16. The Board's present jurisdiction and powers are set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 3.1

(b)(d) (1976).
17. Under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1976), the Board may still refer a case to the
Attorney General for final decision. In practice, such referrals are now rare.
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was before the Board that the actual adjudication was made. For a
time, to meet the exigencies of a burgeoning deportation case load
following the close of hostilities in World War H, the Attorney General delegated decisive authority to the Commissioner, with an optional
right of appeal to the Board from the Commissioner's decision.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 gave finality to the
decisions of the hearing officers in cases of exclusion and deportation. 18 Under the regulations, the Board was given appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of immigration judges in exclusion and
deportation cases. Thus, as matters now stand, the immigration
judges, who are virtually independent of the Service, make final
decisions which are theoretically free from Service control. If the
Service or the alien is aggrieved by such a decision, each has a right
of appeal to the Board19-and Service appeals are not at all infrequent.
The Expanded Role of the Board of ImmigrationAppeals
To meet the changing needs of this dynamic field of law, the
regulations defining the Board's appellate jurisdiction have been
expanded from time to time. In addition to its jurisdiction in deportation and exclusion cases, the Board now hears appeals from decisions in a number of areas: decisions on applications for discretionary waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) and 212(d)(3) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act,2" decisions involving administrative fines and penalties against carriers, 2 1 decisions in visa petitions based on family relationship,2 2 determinations relating to bond,
parole or detention of aliens in deportation proceedings,2 3 and decisions in rescission proceedings under section 246 of the Act.24 In
addition, as incidental to its jurisdiction in exclusion and deportation cases, the Board decides issues with respect to discretionary
relief and other problems arising in the course of such proceedings,
including: waiver of inadmissibility,2 5 determinations as to place of
18. The statute calls these hearing officers special inquiry officers; they are
now referred to as immigrationjudges. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(1) (1976).
19. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1976).

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), (d)(3) (1970).
I. & N. Act § 271(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1970); 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b)(4) (1976).
I. & N. Act § 201(a), (b), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(a), (b) (West Supp. 1977).
Id. § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1970).
8 U.S.C. § 1256 (1970).
I. & N. Act § 212(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1970).

deportation under section 243(a),26 requests for asylum under section
243 (h),2 I applications for suspension under section 244(a),28 voluntary departure under section 244(e),29 adjustment of status under
section 245,30 and registry under section 249. 31 Many of these additional responsibilities have devolved upon the Board to meet the
realities of the first statutory provision for judicial review of deportation orders enacted in 1961 as section 106(a) of the Act.32
Before that enactment, deportation orders were subject to judicial
review in the United States district courts, either by habeas corpus or
suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. To preclude opportunities
for piecemeal and dilatory litigation, Congress enacted section 106(a)
to provide a one-package review of all issues raised in the proceedings leading to a final deportation order. Expeditious review was
provided by eliminating the district courts entirely. The final order of
deportation-that is, the Board's decision-was made reviewable
directly in the United States courts of appeals. Thus, the Board has
been substituted for the district court in the chain of review. 33
THE IMPORTANCE OF GOOD BOARD DECISIONS

To the alien whose destiny is at stake, it is obviously essential that
the Board have the competence, the interest, the resources, and the
time needed to do justice to his appeal and to arrive at the correct
decision. This, of course, should be the overriding interest of everyone involved in the deportation process. But there are certain additional considerations, over and beyond an interest in seeing that
justice is done, that make it imperative that the Board not only arrive
at the correct decision, but also set forth its reasoned views in a lucid
opinion.
The importance of good Board opinions cannot be overemphasized.
For instance, the Board is often innovative. It is frequently the first
tribunal called upon to construe and apply new immigration statutes
and regulations. It establishes uniform standards for the exercise of
administrative discretion. It interprets and applies new court decisions. The Board must make its position as clear as possible so that
the alien and the Service alike may be better able to appraise the
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1970).
27. Id. § 1253(h).

28. Id. § 1254(a).
29. Id. § 1254(e).
30. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255 (West Supp. 1977).

31. 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1970).

32. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5(a), 75 Stat.
65 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1962)).
33. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1967); Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217
(1963).
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need for further review. If there is judicial review of the Board's
decision, it is important to the court of appeals that the Board's
rationale be clearly articulated, for there is no longer an intervening
opinion from the district court. In recent years, there has been an
increasing tendency on the part of the courts of appeals to dispose of
petitions for review of Board orders by brief, unpublished per curiam
dismissals. Thus the Board's opinions are increasingly the last exposition of the law in any forum. As a result, and in view of its enlarged
role, there is greater need than ever for publication of more Board
opinions, not only in defining immigration law and procedure, but in
rationalizing its holdings. Unless the Board can produce opinions of
high quality, its effectiveness will be impaired.
Although most Board decisions are neither published nor subjected
to judicial review, this does not dispense with the need for an opinion
adequate to the needs of the case. Within the Department of Justice
itself, the Board's work is affected by, and in turn affects, the work of
other divisions. The Board does not generate its own cases and has no
control over the inflow of appeals. Accelerated enforcement activities on the part of the Service inevitably result in an increase in
the number of appeals to the Board. The quality and clarity of Board
opinions, which are binding on and carefully scrutinized by Service
officers, directly affect Service operations. To the extent that they
critically examine and rectify errors in Service proceedings, Board
opinions serve as a valuable training mechanism for Service personnel.
In recent years, about twenty percent of the Board's decisions in
deportation cases have been subjected to judicial review. The cases
are defended in the courts by United States Attorneys under the
supervision of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.
When Supreme Court review is sought, the Solicitor General's office
is involved. In the rare instances in which review by the Attorney
General is sought while a case is still in the administrative stage, the
Office of Legal Counsel participates. If the Board has done its work
well, if it comes to the correct legal conclusion and sets forth its views
in a carefully reasoned opinion, the burden of all those in the Department who are later called upon to resolve the case is lightened.
Upgrading the quality of the Board's opinions leads to increased
confidence in the Board's decisions. This, in turn, cuts down on
review litigation, lessens the burdens on the courts, and encourages
summary dismissals in brief, per curiam orders.

The expertise concentrated in the Board, with its relatively small
staff, makes it the ideal place for the formulation of what is now the
definitive decision in this highly complex field of law. In terms of
actual cost to the Government, good Board decisions are a bargain.
More opinions can be ground out, of course, in less time and with an
even more inadequate staff; but the resulting dilution in quality,
while not only unfair to the parties involved, would also cost much
more in the long run. Economies of this sort can only result in passing
the buck to others with less expertise. The slack would have to be
taken up elsewhere in the Department; if not, the already overburdened courts will have to confront the task, for dilution in the quality
of Board decisions can only cause greater recourse to the courts for
redress. If Service errors are to be screened out and corrected, it is
more efficient in the long run that this be done by the Board.
The Board'sRole as Adjudicator
At this late date, no one could seriously argue that the Board's
function is prosecutorial or mainly supportive of the Service in its
enforcement of the immigration laws. While it is an important part of
the administration of these laws, the Board's role is strictly quasijudicial. Indeed, so is the Attorney General's role when he reviews
Board decisions.34
In carrying out its responsibilities, the Board has received a generous charter from the Attorney General: "Subject to any specific
limitation prescribed by this chapter, in considering and determining
cases before it as provided in this part the Board shall exercise such
discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney General by law
as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case."35 In
addressing its responsibilities, the Board has attempted to avoid
rigidity and has been innovative in fashioning reasonable solutions
within the statutory framework. Certainly, in a field fraught with so
many possibilities of human tragedy, a niggardly and wooden approach to adjudication would be out of place. Considerations of
equity and fairness are the concern of administrative adjudicators no
less than courts:
The principles of equity are not to be isolated as a special province of
the courts. They are rather to be welcomed as reflecting fundamental
principles of justice that properly enlighten administrative agencies
under law. The courts may not rightly treat administrative agencies as
alien intruders poaching on the court's private preserves of justice.
34. "As you know, the Board is a non-statutory body established by the
Attorney General to hear and decide appeals from certain decisions of
the Service. In that respect the Board acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.
So does the Attorney General in deciding Board decisions certified to
him." Uman, There Is Justice, 52 INTERPRETER RELEASES 315 (1975).
35. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (1976).
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Courts and agencies properly take cognizance of one another as shar-

ing responsibility for achieving the necessities of control in an increasingly complex society without sacrifice of fundamental principles of

fairness and justice.
The Commission's actions were rooted in a reasonable effort to
combine a sense of justice with practical common
sense. Courts are
36
loath to say that good sense is not good law.

A narrow and literal reading of the statutes would make the
Board's task much easier. The temptation to reach for simplistic
solutions always exists, leaving to the reviewing courts the option to
take corrective action where more sophisticated or daring techniques
may be appropriate. To its credit, the Board traditionally has not
taken the easy path but has invested the time and effort needed to
work out reasonable answers to vexing and complex problems.
Backlogs-Quality or Quantity?
One of the persistent problems confronting the Board has been that
of case backlogs. The problem is not new. In December, 1952, a
management study for the Department of Justice prepared by an
outside management consultant reflected that there were then 4,421
cases before the Board.3 7 The problem at that time was resolved by
temporarily augmenting the Board's professional staff.
Large backlogs at the Board are not only unfair but wasteful. They
are unfair to the subjects of the proceedings, who should not have the
adjudication of their rights unduly delayed. They are unfair to the
Service, which should not be hampered in its already difficult tasks
by further delay. Backlogs waste already strained resources. They
engender inquiries and follow-ups, cause unnecessary traffic in files,
and disrupt the normal work flow. Backlogs can and should be
decreased to manageable proportions. The question is how?
The Board has no control over the number of cases that come
before it on appeal. The Service's enforcement operations have increased in recent years, both through augmented manpower and
shifting work priorities. As a result, more aliens alleged to be here
illegally have been apprehended, more deportation hearings have
been held, and more appeals to the Board have been taken. In fiscal
year 1962, when the Board had thirty authorized full-time positions,
it received 1194 new cases. As of April 30, 1977, when the staff
36. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
37. Report on a Management Study of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Griffenhagen & Associates, management consultants, 1952).

numbered thirty-six, the number of new cases received had risen to
2,651.38
One easy solution to the management of backlogs is for the Board
to decrease the time invested in each case. Heretofore, the Board
members themselves have reviewed the cases coming before the
Board and have made their decisions on the record, which was then
referred to a staff attorney to draft a Board opinion in accordance
with its directive. However, much time and effort on the part of the
individual Board members can be saved by referring the case, in the
first instance, directly to a staff attorney for initial review and formulation of the Board's decision. Similarly, by concentrating on the
use of one-line dismissal orders in place of the usual fully developed
Board opinion, much time and effort can be saved on the part of the
clerical staff, the staff attorneys, and individual Board members.
These practices and devices can readily lead to both a marked upswing in the number of cases disposed of and to a dramatic reduction
in the Board's backlog. Whether this result is justified by the price
that must be paid in terms of dilution of quality is a question on
which there may be differences of opinion.
It seems to me that the only satisfactory way to confront the
backlog problem is to give the Board the needed additional resources-adequate in quality as well as in number-to cope with its
mounting caseload. To reduce the quality of the Board's work, even
as a temporary expedient, is to me an impermissible approach. What
about the persons whose rights have been prejudiced by less than
standard Board consideration during the temporary period of shortcuts?
It is true that some of the appeals that come to the Board are
frivolous and filed solely for delay. These can be readily detected on
initial screening and assigned directly to a staff attorney for prompt
preparation of a brief dismissal order without impairing the alien's
rights.3 9 Similarly, initial screening can detect appeals which, while
not frivolous, present simple issues clearly governed by recognized
Board precedents. These, too, can be referred directly to a staff
attorney to draft an appropriate and brief dismissal order. I have
considerable doubt, however, whether the same direct referral is
appropriate in the more difficult cases that make their way to the
Board.
A good many appeals, for example, involve the exercise of administrative discretion-an area in which realistic standards are sadly
38. Milhollan, The Work of the Board, 54 INTERPRETER RELEASES 322, 323

(1977).
39. The regulations authorize the denial of oral argument and summary dismissal of such appeals. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1-a) (1976).
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lacking.4" The Board rather than staff attorneys, most of whom are
likely to be relatively new and inexperienced, should first review and
decide such cases. Where the initial Board review discloses the need
for additional legal research, the case should, of course, be assigned
to a staff attorney for that purpose.
While it may be true that other federal administrative tribunals,
such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, have difficult cases which receive original review by their professional staffs, it is erroneous to equate the Board's
cases with those of the other agencies. Because of the financial interests involved, the parties to the proceedings before those agencies are
invariably represented by counsel. Large agency staffs are available
to brief and argue cases before the agency. In the cases that come
before the Board, many of the aliens are unrepresented or were
unrepresented at the hearing before the immigration judge. Even
when the alien before the Board has counsel, the quality of representation may still be inadequate. Not all attorneys or other representatives who appear in immigration cases have the necessary expertise.
STAFFING THE BOARD

The quality of the Board's decisions must rest essentially on the
number and capability of its personnel-that is, the Board members,
the professional staff, and the supporting administrative and clerical
personnel. Serious inadequacy in any one of these areas undermines
the Board's capacity to perform adequately. Unfortunately, there
have been times when departmental failure to fill existing vacancies,
or to recognize the need for increased staffing, has left the Board
handicapped with inadequate resources.
More serious are the handicaps which result from the appointment
of personnel who lack the professional aptitudes or personal qualities needed to do the Board's work effectively. Unfortunately, from
time to time, political or other considerations have led to appointments such as these, and the work of the Board has suffered.
To cope with the highly complicated and extremely technical immigration and nationality laws takes professional competence of the
highest order. The additional qualities that enter into the making of a
sound judge go beyond mere competence as a lawyer. Because the
40. See Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the Im-

migration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 144 (1975).

production of formal opinions plays such a large and important role
in the Board's mission, the art of communication-expressing ideas
clearly and grammatically-is an essential requisite not only for the
Board's staff attorneys but also for Board members. To attract candidates with these qualifications, the compensation should be commensurate with the expertise and responsibility required. This is far
from the case at the Board.
The Board was last reclassified in pay grade in 1960: the Board
members were placed in grade GS-15, and the Chairman was classified GS-16. Since then, the work and the responsibility of the
Board have increased tremendously. The Service attorneys who appear before the Board have long since been upgraded and are now
classified as GS-15. The Service's immigration judges and District
Directors, whose decisions the Board reviews, are now in grades GS15 and upward. Yet all efforts to raise the Board's grades from the
classification fixed in 1960 have thus far been unsuccessful. To maintain the pay scale at such an unrealistically low level is not only
unfair to the Board members who have the necessary qualifications,
but it can only discourage qualified candidates from seeking places
on the Board when vacancies occur while at the same time tending to
attract political hacks who cannot aspire to the better paying jobs in
Government. It is time that the Board as an institution was upgraded,
even if it takes legislation to do what should long since have been
done administratively.
Such an artificially depressed pay classification at the Board level
must necessarily depress the classifications available to the staff
attorneys because no more than a GS-14 can be permitted them-no
matter how great their expertise or how long their service at the
Board. Bright, young, and inexperienced attorneys, fresh from law
school, can be recruited at the lower grade levels and induced to
remain for a while as they gain expertise and qualify for promotion.
But in the long run they will inevitably turn elsewhere, for the Board
cannot effectively compete with other Government agencies offering
higher pay for legal work of no higher order. The Board's staffing
problems can only be aggravated while such an unfair disparity
continues to exist.
QualificationStandardsfor Board Members
In the final analysis, the effectiveness of the Board as a quasijudicial tribunal depends largely on the calibre of the Board members. Each member, by his vote in a given case, not only affects the
alien who is the subject of the proceedings but shapes the course of
the law to be applied in all cases. To the degree that any member may
lack legal acumen, capacity for clear thinking and expression, famil-
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iarity with immigration and nationality law, judicial temperament,
willingness to work hard and accept responsibility, or a feeling for
people, he fails to carry his share of the load and casts a further
burden on the remaining members.
Every Board member should be not merely a member of the Bar but
an excellent lawyer. Beyond that, he must have the qualities of an
astute judge. He should have intellectual integrity and the capacity
to appraise critically new notions and arguments which at first blush
may appear unacceptable. He should be sufficiently secure emotionally that he can recede from previously held positions, when presented with convincing reasons, without damage to his self-esteem.
Especially in the field of immigration law enforcement, where so
much power is wielded over the destiny of human beings, judicial
temperament encompasses many more qualities than may be needed
in other contexts. An alien's whole future may depend on the way a
Board member exercises administrative discretion. A Board member
who lacks compassion or who is hostile and uses his power to vent his
spleen on the object of his hostility can do much harm. A Board
member should be free of the obvious prejudices, such as those based
on race, religion or national origin. He must also be tolerant and
capable of exercising discretion favorably, even- to persons whose
cultural patterns or life style may be alien to his own.
It takes a long time for even a good lawyer to become proficient in
the intricacies of immigration and nationality law. To expect a new
Board member without adequate background in this field to cast a
meaningful vote in each case that comes before him for decision is
wholly unrealistic. Candidates for a Board membership should not
only have specific knowledge of the law but should have demonstrated some concrete interest in the Board's work and some evidence
that they have thought critically about the problems involved. Many
qualified candidates can be found among the attorneys who
specialize in this field, both within and outside Government service,
and among the law school faculties. Partisan political considerations
should not be the dominant factors in selecting Board members.
When they are, and when competence and experience are considered
as secondary, the work of the Board inevitably suffers.
CONCLUSION:

A

STATUTORY

BOARD

The foregoing analysis of the origins of the Board, its expanded role
as an adjudicative body, and the ever-present problem of adequate

staffing, necessarily lead to the following conclusion. It is time to
give the Board statutory standing. Its existence as a quasi-judicial
tribunal within the Department of Justice should be recognized by
Congress. The Chairman and Board members should be given a more
realistic salary classification, one more in keeping with their positions and responsibilities. Like the assistant attorneys general who
supervise the various departmental divisions and other officials, the
Chairman and Board members should be Presidential appointees
confirmed by the Senate. Although it may be asserted that this would
throw the Board into the political arena, the fact remains that, realistically speaking, the Board is already there. Some attorneys general, in making appointments to the Board, have been careful to screen
the applicants for ability and experience. Others have not. Presidential appointees, at least, go through the screening process in the
course of Senate confirmation. Judging by recent experience, the
Senate is taking its responsibilities in this regard very seriously and
has been rejecting nominees it considers lacking in the needed qualifications. Screening cannot help but enhance the calibre of the
appointees and with it the capacity of the Board to perform its
important function.

